|
[
Economy > Cover Story ]
 wo thousand and three marks the 50th anniversary of the Korean/American alliance. It is rare for any alliance to be maintained for a halfcentury, and the achievements of the Korean/American alliance point to it as an example of one of the most successful ever formed. The parties first established their formal relationship in May 1882 when Joseon, the last kingdom of Korea contracted the “Treaty of Amity and Commerce” with the United States of America. With an exchange of teams of liaison officers, the Korean/U.S. military relationship began.
However, the modern military relationship was initiated by the American military dispatching troops to Korea south of the 38th parallel in order to disarm defeated Japanese troops in August 1945.
The U.S. contribution to the Republic of Korea during the Korean War, which erupted five years later, was the basis of the current Korean/American alliance. Directly after the signing of the armistice, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was concluded in Washington D.C. on Oct. 1st 1953, and has been in effect since Nov. 18th 1954.
The alliance remains vital to the security of South Korea. However, also it is true that circumstances today are vastly different from what they were in 1953 when the alliance was first established.
Therefore, the optimal alliance with the United States should be one that satisfies the strategic needs of both countries. This does not mean a relationship whereby United States gives unilateral support to South Korea; rather, through this relationship, the two countries should determine and implement an alliance based on mutual strategic and shared interests. Objectively, the Korean/American alliance has generated huge benefits. Its greatest contributions may be subsumed under the headings “military/security” and “economy/society.” First, in terms of military/security, the most significant contribution of the alliance is the fact that the military threat from the North has been successfully restrained by the presence of the U.S. Armed Forces in South Korea.
THE TRIPWIRE EFFECT Second, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) has contributed considerably to Northeast Asian peace and stability in general. The presence of the USFK has acted as a military “trip wire,” guaranteeing the automatic intervention of the world’s sole superpower should the North attack the South. In particular, the 15,000-strong, heavy armor 2nd Infantry Division of the USFK deployed in North Gyeonggi Province, (accounting for 40 percent of the entire USFK presence), is responsible for the entire frontline in the event of a possible North Korean invasion.
Third, the USFK has contributed enormously to the economic development of the South by permitting massively reduced security costs than what would otherwise obtain. If the USFK ever withdraws, the additional defense budget will reach astronomical proportions in order to achieve the same potential. Coupled with the 2nd Infantry Division, the Seventh Air Force, armed with tactical aircraft such as the F-16 and A-10 represents 30 percent of the entire air force capability in Korea. Furthermore, information collection and early warning capabilities via satellite and U-2 surveillance aircraft are significant factors reinforcing South Korean defense capability.
Fourth, the USFK serves as a symbol of the relationship implicit in the Korean/American alliance.
From a geostrategic perspective, the alliance underpins the Republic of Korea’s ability to maintain relations with its powerful neighbors. By the same token, it will permit national reunification to take place under stable conditions in such an eventuality, so ensuring the survival and prosperity of Southern society and structures. The USFK will also be a guarantor of regional stability in the Asian northeast while reunification is in train. In short, while South Korea will effectively lead the drive toward reunification, the United States will be its main collaborator.
In terms of societal and economic impact, one outstanding although intangible benefit is that the alliance has served to increase exchange and cooperation between the two countries. First, it has made a great contribution to general exchange between Korean and American civil societies. In addition to being the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the ROK/U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement, 2003 is also, coincidently the 100th anniversary of the start of Korean immigration to the United States. Since 102 Koreans arrived in Hawaii to work in the then-U.S. territory’s sugarcane plantations on Jan. 13th 1903, the Korean community has grown through successive waves of migration to 2 million. In the process they have become model immigrants and built strong links between Korea and their adopted country. The economic relationship between two countries is so developed that in 2001, the United States accounted for 15.9 percent of all Korean imports and consumed 20.7 percent of total exports.
 AVOIDING OVERDEPENDENCE Second, the alliance has become the cornerstone of national peace and prosperity, based on a mutual commitment to democracy.
In fact, there have been innumerable contributions by the alliance with the United States to the relationship between the two countries. At the same time it is important to bear in mind the difficulties that are part and parcel of the alliance. For example, there is a national consensus that the SOFA is unfair, being slanted in favor of the United States. Furthermore, that it has created overdependence on the United States in the political, economic, societal and cultural spheres, and so served to somewhat retard the growth of Korean society. Such aspects of the alliance are long overdue for overhauling with the aim of a healthier partnership in the future.
Despite its stellar successes, the Korean/U.S alliance is compelled to undergo significant alteration due to recent changes in the global and domestic situations of the two countries. It can be argued, for example, that South Korea is no longer the weak and vulnerable nation it once was and in dire need of unilateral support by the United States in the general areas of politics, economy and defense. Koreans have justifiable pride in having witnessed their country as an actor on the world stage, by, for example, acceding to the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and hosting major events such as the Olympic Games and the World Cup. Understandably, Koreans wish their country to be accorded the kind of respect concomitant with international achievements such as these. As a result of the ongoing processes of democratization, which began in the 1980s, and informatization, which began in the 1990s, Internet-oriented twenty- and thirty-somethings have emerged as a new political force and tend to seek a more detached relationship with the United States.
Whereas in the past, the fissure lines in Korean politics were between the regions, those between the generations are becoming more important. To wit, the different perspectives on North Korea and the United States worked as a key variable in the Korean presidential election held at the end of 2002.
Second, the reduced threat from the North is also emerging as an important force for change in the relationship between two countries. Through the longrunning policy of embracement (the “Sunshine Policy”) coupled with the “Internet generation’s” more positive image of the North, Southern society is mired in valueconfusion in regard to North Korea.
While some sectors of society claim that the positive feelings toward the North by the young is only romanticism on the part of a generation with no experience of war, such a change is the inevitable outcome of greater changes in all aspects of Korean society. That said, it should be pointed out that in spite of continuous efforts toward reconciliation and collaboration by the South, the North is still the same in many aspects: vested with a political structure characterized by an overwhelming concentration of power; a society imbued with a personality cult; and a diplomacy based on shock tactics designed to elicit short-term gains.
 EXPANDING COMMON INTERESTS Third, the changed perspective on the United States is also a crucial factor for promoting change. In spite of a variety of changes over the last half-century, the Korean/American relationship still operates as if the ink was still wet on the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. The unfairness of the SOFA, one of the most critical Korea/United States issues in an obvious example. While no one can deny that the United States is Korea’s most important security partner, it is questionable whether the current sentiment of Koreans is the same as it was in the early 1950s when the treaty was signed. In other words, though the reality of the relationship has changed, the principles that govern it are still slanted in favor of the United States. The security situation on the peninsula has changed internally and externally since the historic inter-Korea summit meeting of June 2000. Therefore, these altered circumstances should be reflected in the alliance for the good of the overall relationship.
Despite the various disputes that have beset it, the alliance is nonetheless rooted in the need to protect and promote common strategic interests. The future of the alliance, and by extension, that of the Korean/U.S. relationship relies solely on how well the parties will maintain and expand such interests.
The USFK is critical for the security of South Korea but it is necessary to understand it as a part of global and Asian U.S. military strategy. The U.S., as a powerful, Western hemisphere maritime nation, is in need of East Asian military bases in order to maintain its influence in the vast Pacific area. The United States has regarded East Asia as critical to its interests since it entered the Korean War to force back an expansion of communist power after World War II. An outline of general U.S. strategic concepts is to be found in the East Asian Strategy Reports (EASR) issued by the U.S. Department of Defense.
The 1998 EASR indicated that the keynote of U.S East Asian Strategy should be comprehensive engagement rather than the simple presence of U.S military forces. The report stated that the primary role of the U.S forces in the Asian region is to contain regional risks, and that the presence of these forces is a visible display of the commitment of the United States to its regional security interests. On U.S. Asian strategy, the report emphasizes the role of stationed forces as a deterrent and in creating an atmosphere of security.
 STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE The U.S. has declared since 1995 that it would continuously station about 100,000 troops in the Asia/Pacific region; most are concentrated in South Korea and Japan. Such concentrations owe to the strategic importance of those nations. In the event of an emergency in Asia, to project military capability directly from the U.S. mainland would result in complications because of the huge distances involved. It is thus a prerequisite to have military bases accessible by U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan in order to implement U.S. military strategy. The importance of Asia is highlighted in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001, which refers to the rise of China, the importance of allied nations, enhancing the accessibility of U.S. forces in areas of strategic interest, and maintaining military strength throughout the military’s outposts.
Meanwhile, changes in technology, growing discomfort with the presence of U.S. troops (brought to flashpoint last year following the deaths of two middleschool girls by a U.S. armored vehicle on maneuvers) and undesirability of American forces becoming hostages to the North’s long-range weaponry prompted Washington to reassess its stance on the peninsula. The Pentagon has already committed to reducing the number of bases on the peninsula from 41 to 23, to relocating all its forces south of the Han River to its extant bases at Pyeongtaek and Osan, and is openly mulling troop reductions and placing greater reliance on long-range aerial strike capability.
The complete withdrawal of USKF has been the subject of serious discussions three times since the Korean War. The first followed a press conference by then-President Richard Nixon held in Guam July 25th 1969 without prior notice before beginning a five-nation tour of Asia. In the course of the conference he made a bombshell declaration that became known as the Guam or Nixon Doctrine. The key point of the declaration was that Asian countries should free themselves from their reliance on the United States and henceforth take care of their own military defense. According to the doctrine, the 7th Division of the USFK, amounting to 20,000 troops was to be withdrawn by March 1971. President Jimmy Carter devised the second withdrawal plan in 1977, chiefly to show his displeasure with the dictatorial Park Chung-Hee regime. Two years later under intense pressure from his subordinates, and members of the U.S. Congress who claimed he was acting irresponsibly, he reluctantly agreed to reverse his decision.
NORTHERN INTRANSINGENCY Finally, the third and last occasion when the withdrawal of USFK was mooted was part of a cost-cutting plan under the Nunn-Warner Amendment. In July 1989, U.S. senators Sam Nunn and John W. Warner proposed a three-phase withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula, the first involving a reduction from 43,000 to 36,000 by the end of 1991. While the first phase was successfully executed, the other two were deferred indefinitely because of North Korea’s intransigency over allowing inspections of what was then suspected to be (and now confirmed) a nuclear weapons program at its Yongbyon facility.
Thus, discussion on the redeployment or cutting of forces is nothing new. What has changed is the technological capability of the military, as mentioned above, plus the international power structure. During the Cold War, the watchword concerning the use of the U.S military was restraint, marked by an avoidance of large-scaled conventional attack. Today, U.S military strategy is focused on projecting overwhelming power promptly enough to swiftly achieve victory in conflicts in any part of the world. To this end, the United States has reinforced its Marine/Air forces and increased its cutting-edge weapon deployment.
In addition, to reduce the risk of anti-Americanism, the United States is judging it prudent cut back on infantry deployment if local political and social circumstances so dictate.
Therefore, the redeployment and reduction of the USFK is the inevitable result of changes in U.S military strategy. This being the case, it is incumbent upon South Korea to plan accordingly, taking steps to ensure that the joint defense capability in no ways weakens.
 Although it attracted little attention from the domestic press because of its focus on the prospect of an amendment to the SOFA, the 34th annual meeting of the Korea/American Security Committee (SCM) held in Washington D.C. in December 2002 set the future direction of the American military presence on the peninsula. In the course of the meeting, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and South Korean Minister of National Defense, Lee Jun agreed on a joint program to formulate a blueprint for the future of the USFK 30 years hence. Accordingly, Korean/American military authorities met in April this year to begin a series of discussions to determine a future policy for the Korean/American alliance focused specifically on the issues of USFK redeployment and troop reductions. This was closely followed by the May 14th Korea/U.S. summit in Washington D.C, where President Roh Moo-Hyun and President George W. Bush agreed that any redeployment of the USFK from north of the Han River should only be pursed after the North Korean nuclear issue has been resolved. However, in only the second meeting on future policy for the alliance held June 5th, the two nations agreed on the redeployment of the 2nd Infantry Division south of the Han River and the relocation of USFK bases. The main Yongsan base in Seoul will be closed by 2006 while USFK headquarters will be transferred to Osan in 2004 as a preliminary to the Osan/Pyeongtaek area becoming the future hub of American military activities on the peninsula.
UNSATISFACTORY SOFA Given the generally acknowledged deterrent effect of the USFK against any attack by North Korea, the South Korean government and the U.S. should give attention to the fact that the concerns of Koreans lie in amending what they consider to be an unfair SOFA rather than the withdrawal of the USFK. Reestablishment of the alliance should start from the rediscovery of strategically shared interests and acknowledgement of the following basic assumptions.
 It should be understood that the alliance relationship is asymmetric
In other words, the relationship is unequal because in accepting security guarantees from a much more powerful country, South Korea does not have full autonomy in deciding its own policy. The asymmetric nature of the alliance is under fire because South Koreans seek recognition of the maturity of their country and better control over their relations with the North. Recognizing these aspirations, President Roh has emphasized the need for a more autonomous diplomacy regarding the relationship with the U.S. However, in consideration of the realpolitik of international relations, it is more advisable for South Korea to strive for more realistic goals, pursuing greater autonomy within the confines of an asymmetric relationship.
Korea should make it clear that the objective of alliance reestablish-ment is not the withdrawal of the USKF but a more harmonious relation-ship based on an amended SOFA
The most desirable alliance relationship, of course, would be one where the two parties discuss the major issues of mutual concern and work to minimize the differences. However, the major problem in the current Korean/American alliance relationship is that the United States tends to makes unilateral decisions about critical issues on which national survival often hinges. Even worse, prior notice is often not given. For example, completely unbeknown to the government in the South, the United States was poised to launch airstrikes against North Korea to resolve the 1994 nuclear crisis.
The two nations should acknowledge that the USFK is vital not only to Korean security but also to stability in the entire Asian northeast
By maintaining the alliance, the United States will retain a strategic base in Asia, and for South Korea, it has the advantage of the U.S. security guarantee while conceding a measure of autonomy. As long as the basic threat to security comes from the North, reality dictates that the key to peace on the Korean Peninsula is the Korean/American alliance and the USFK.
The long-term ideal scenario envisaged by most South Koreans would be that Seoul assumes all defense responsibilities as a sovereign nation and that the USFK withdraw from the Korean Peninsula. Once a lasting peace is established between the two Koreas and a multilateral security infrastructure is realized in the Asia region, the rationale for the USFK may eventually disappear. However, in the short to mid-term, the USFK and the alliance are necessary. Any hasty withdrawal in the current climate might not only excite North Korean ambitions but also an arms race between China and Japan. Therefore, any change in the alliance relationship and status of the USFK should be managed in a step-bystep fashion in order to minimize risk. However, the two guiding principles in reestablishing the alliance should be to further peaceful reunification on the Korean Peninsula at the same time as deterring any attempt by the North to use force.
THE ONLY OPTION FOR PEACE A restored alliance should be capable of promoting the shared interests of the two nations, as well as reflecting Korea’s autonomous defense capability and national prestige. Implicit in such an alliance should be the principle of sharing associated burdens and costs. Based on the above principles, the writer wishes to suggest the following policy improvements to reinforce the Korean/American alliance.
The most serious drawback to the relationship with the United States since the inauguration of the Roh administration is the lack of basic trust between the two governments
It behooves the South Korean government to rebuild lost trust with Washington. Significant concerns about the alliance have recently surfaced due to a recent wave of anti-American sentiment; the nationalistic stance of President Roh’s administration; the liberal disposition of the president’s staff; and certain comments about the Korean/American relationship and the North Korean nuclear issue. While President Roh adopted a more conventional diplomatic stance during his summit meeting with President Bush to win the approval of Korea’s conservatives, he drew broadsides from the progressive element (and the North) because he appeared too pro-American. Despite the brickbats, however, President Roh should maintain the diplomatic posture he adopted in Washington since to the Americans his behavior appeared totally consistent with what they are accustomed to a South Korean leader, and trust in any relationship is only possible when one party can predict the other’s behavior.
Any discussion on cutting or redeploying American forces should be deferred until the situation on the Korean Peninsula stabilizes
Even though two governments have agreed to redeploy the USFK, North Korea remains a conventional and nuclear threat. Meanwhile, the Korean/American relationship is shaky, and such discussions are only encouraging the North’s destabilizing tactics. As long as the North’s threat persists, South Korea has no other choice but to continue the alliance. Only the United States can be the South’s viable security resource.
The difference in perspectives on North Kore a between South Korea and the United States is too far apart and must converge
U.S. and South Korean perspectives on the North Korea continue to diverge.
Whereas Seoul, through its engagement policy, believes the best way to influence Pyongyang’s behavior is the “carrot” effect, the United States conversely considers the North’s sole incentive to change is by administration of the proverbial “whip. ” Since the main cause of tension in the Korean/American relationship is rooted in differences in perceptions of North Korea and how to deal with its erratic behavior, the two allies should work to form a consensus on the North in order to enhance their understanding of its motives and form a common policy front.
The new government should respond appropriately to curb anti-Americanism
Continued anti-American sentiment will inevitably lead to anti-Korean sentiment among the U.S. public and decision makers, possibly leading to calls for withdraw of U.S. forces. For example, while garnering national support for an amendment to the SOFA, the Kim Dae-Jung administration consequently caused irrevocable damage by responding lukewarmly to the candlelight demonstrations that swept the nation following the deaths of the two middleschool girls.
Korea should expand the base of its diplomacy toward the United States
Korean diplomacy toward the United States has thus far been focused on the administration, but it is essential to take new initiatives in view of the changes within the Washington power structure. U.S diplomacy has an increasing tendency to be legislated by Congress, with the administration increasingly seeking closer cooperation with The Hill on diplomatic issues. Where official communication with Congress proves difficult, efforts should be exerted to establish “Track-II,” i.e., nongovernmental, unofficial channels. Systematic collection of personal data and on the Congressional activities of post (Korean) War generation Congressmen will be the foundation for a broader diplomatic offensive toward the United States than has hitherto been undertaken.
The Korean/American alliance is still vital to both parties. Along with U.S forces stationed in Japan, the USFK serves as a bridgehead to implement U.S Asian military strategy. In recognition of the mutual value of the alliance, each government should take steps to ensure the relationship does not deteriorate further. The Roh government should emulate Japan in actively reinforcing its alliance with the United States by stressing common interests.
Intensive industrialization and the high density of population on the Korea Peninsula would ensure huge loss of life and inestimable damage on both sides of the DMZ should war break out. Therefore, a Second Korean War should be avoided at all costs. Currently, it is out of contention that the South Korean military could repel the North should it invade the South again. Therefore, in consideration of the holocaust that modern war would invite, prevention is the only option and one best achieved by reinforcing the Korean/American alliance without due delay.
By Lee Sang-Hyun(shlee@sejong.org)
Security Research Center, The Sejong Institute
|
